Conscientious objection, harm reduction and abortion care by FLETCHER, R
	   1	  
Conscientious	  objection,	  harm	  reduction	  and	  abortion	  care	  
Ruth	  Fletcher	  
	  
A	  forthcoming	  chapter	  in	  Mary	  Donnelly	  and	  Claire	  Murray	  (eds.)	  Ethical	  and	  Legal	  
Debates	  in	  Irish	  Healthcare:	  Confronting	  Complexities	  (Manchester	  University	  Press,	  
2016).	  	  	  
	  
[Note:	  This	  is	  the	  pre-­‐publication	  version,	  which	  has	  been	  updated	  in	  light	  of	  the	  UKSC	  
decision	  in	  Doogan	  and	  Wood	  (2014)]	  
	  Introduction	  	  
The	  scope	  of	  any	  legal	  right	  to	  refuse	  abortion	  care	  merits	  particular	  consideration	  given	  
the	  recent	  passing	  of	  the	  Protection	  of	  Life	  During	  Pregnancy	  Act	  2013	  (PLDPA)	  and	  
ongoing	  demand	  for	  abortion	  reform.	  	  Irish	  health	  scholarship	  and	  practice	  may	  benefit	  
from	  an	  account	  of	  conscientious	  objection	  (CO)	  that	  clarifies	  when	  CO	  is	  legitimately	  
engaged	  by	  a	  refusal	  to	  provide	  care	  and	  whether	  CO	  is	  limited	  given	  its	  potential	  effect	  
as	  a	  barrier	  to	  women’s	  lawful	  access	  to	  abortion.	  	  This	  chapter	  responds	  to	  these	  
concerns	  by	  arguing	  for	  a	  harm	  reduction	  approach	  to	  conscientious	  objection.	  	  Those	  
who	  wish	  to	  refuse	  provision	  of	  healthcare	  in	  spite	  of	  a	  legal	  obligation,	  and	  those	  who	  
wish	  to	  provide	  healthcare	  in	  spite	  of	  a	  legal	  prohibition,	  may	  be	  harmed	  by	  having	  to	  
act	  against	  their	  most	  intimate	  convictions.	  	  Moreover,	  public	  reasoning	  about	  the	  
proper	  scope	  of	  healthcare	  provision	  could	  be	  disadvantaged	  by	  a	  failure	  to	  recognize	  a	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space	  for	  critical	  consciousness.	  The	  need	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  harm	  to	  women,	  whose	  
lawful	  entitlement	  to	  access	  abortion	  has	  been	  hard-­‐won,	  also	  animates	  the	  justification	  
for	  legal	  limits	  on	  CO.	  	  In	  arguing	  for	  a	  harm	  reduction	  approach,	  the	  account	  offered	  
here	  draws	  on	  but	  distinguishes	  itself	  from	  those	  who	  have	  relied	  on	  public	  obligations	  
to	  refute	  CO	  and	  those	  who	  have	  relied	  on	  an	  individual	  right	  to	  moral	  integrity	  to	  
ground	  CO.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Conscientious	  objection	  and	  critical	  consciousness	  
Some	  believe	  that	  healthcare	  professionals	  should	  not	  be	  able	  to	  refuse	  healthcare	  on	  
grounds	  of	  conscience	  (Savulescau,	  2006;	  Gallagher	  et	  al,	  2013:	  6;	  Kelleher,	  2010;	  Fiala	  
and	  Arthur,	  2014)	  and	  that	  CO	  operates	  simply	  as	  an	  obstacle	  to	  women’s	  access	  to	  
healthcare	  (Thomson,	  2013).	  	  Their	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  duty	  to	  provide	  public	  
healthcare	  requires	  that	  providers	  put	  their	  personal	  views	  and	  opinions	  to	  one	  side.	  	  If	  
acting	  on	  one’s	  personal	  views	  in	  refusing	  to	  provide	  healthcare	  is	  done	  for	  
discriminatory	  or	  otherwise	  harmful	  reasons,	  I	  agree	  that	  this	  is	  not	  acceptable.	  	  	  But	  it	  is	  
obviously	  not	  unacceptable	  in	  itself	  to	  act	  on	  one’s	  personal	  commitments	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  providing	  healthcare	  (Dickens,	  2014:	  212).	  	  Secondly,	  requiring	  health	  
professionals	  to	  act	  against	  their	  conscience	  when	  another	  alternative	  is	  available,	  risks	  
taking	  much	  of	  the	  good	  out	  of	  the	  duty	  to	  care.	  	  If,	  as	  Campbell	  (2011a)	  notes,	  the	  
effect	  of	  this	  is	  that	  the	  genuine	  objector	  leaves	  healthcare	  the	  complete	  rejection	  of	  CO	  
may	  be	  counterproductive.	  Thirdly,	  it	  is	  not	  good	  for	  those	  receiving	  healthcare	  to	  have	  
to	  worry	  about	  the	  commitment	  of	  their	  healthcare	  provider	  to	  the	  healthcare	  sought.	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It	  would	  be	  better	  if	  the	  question	  of	  CO	  were	  openly	  addressed.	  	  As	  I	  argue	  below,	  there	  
are	  considerable	  limits	  on	  CO.	  	  But	  any	  legal	  test	  for	  the	  scope	  of	  CO	  ought	  to	  recognize	  
that	  its	  objective	  is	  to	  prevent	  any	  psychological	  harm	  to	  healthcare	  providers	  that	  may	  
occur	  if	  they	  are	  required	  to	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  goes	  against	  their	  moral	  choices	  and	  
intimate	  convictions.	  	  	  
	   Others	  argue	  that	  conscientious	  objection	  in	  a	  health	  care	  context	  is	  a	  right	  
which	  results	  from	  respect	  for	  the	  moral	  integrity	  of	  the	  individual	  (Wicclair,	  2011;	  
Campbell,	  2011a).	  	  On	  this	  understanding,	  conscientious	  objection	  arises	  when	  
preserving	  an	  individual’s	  moral	  integrity	  requires	  the	  breaking	  of	  a	  legal	  norm.	  	  This	  is	  
why	  the	  right	  to	  CO	  may	  be	  narrowly	  drawn.	  	  Everyone	  is	  under	  a	  duty	  to	  abide	  by	  legal	  
norms	  and	  any	  derogation	  from	  a	  legal	  obligation	  to	  provide	  healthcare	  has	  to	  be	  
restrictive	  (see	  further	  Montgomery,	  2015).	  	  This	  approach	  to	  CO	  is	  important	  in	  
identifying	  a	  violation	  of	  an	  individual’s	  moral	  integrity	  as	  the	  harm	  which	  CO	  addresses	  
and	  in	  implying	  a	  narrow	  scope	  for	  CO	  given	  its	  location	  as	  dissent	  within	  a	  framework	  
of	  lawful	  norms.	  	  Scholars	  such	  as	  Dickens,	  Cook	  and	  Joffe	  have	  done	  important	  work	  in	  
reminding	  us	  that	  conscientious	  responses	  in	  healthcare	  are	  not	  always	  refusals	  to	  
provide	  healthcare	  and	  are	  not	  always	  motivated	  by	  a	  conservative	  or	  ‘sanctity	  of	  life’	  
approach	  to	  ethical	  questions	  (Dickens,	  2014:	  233-­‐238,	  Cook	  and	  Dickens,	  2011;	  
Dickens,	  2006;	  Joffe,	  1996).	  	  As	  Murphy	  noted	  recently	  in	  an	  Irish	  context,	  healthcare	  
professionals	  also	  act	  out	  of	  a	  conscientious	  commitment	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  abortion	  
care	  (2014).	  	  Pro-­‐choice	  doctors	  see	  the	  harm	  which	  abortion	  restrictions	  have	  on	  
women’s	  lives	  and	  challenge	  legal	  failures	  to	  endorse	  abortion	  provision	  (Doctors	  for	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Choice,	  2014).	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  draw	  these	  different	  threads	  together	  to	  argue	  for	  a	  
reframing	  of	  CO	  as	  an	  exercise	  in	  critical	  consciousness	  within	  a	  harm	  reduction	  
framework.	  	  I	  reflect	  on	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (ECHR)	  and	  comparative	  
jurisprudence	  and	  policy	  in	  fleshing	  out	  a	  framework	  for	  interpreting	  the	  section	  17	  right	  
in	  the	  PLDPA	  not	  to	  “carry	  out,	  or	  to	  assist	  in	  carrying	  out,	  any	  medical	  procedure	  
referred	  to	  in	  section	  7(1)	  or	  section	  9(1)”	  on	  grounds	  of	  CO.	  	  	  Both	  sections	  refer	  to	  
medical	  procedures	  “in	  the	  course	  of	  which,	  or	  as	  a	  result	  of	  which,	  an	  unborn	  human	  
life	  is	  ended.”	  
	  
Bearers	  of	  critical	  consciousness	  
The	  grounding	  of	  the	  right	  to	  conscientious	  objection	  in	  critical	  consciousness	  is	  an	  
important	  factor	  in	  understanding	  why	  CO	  usually	  ought	  not	  apply	  to	  corporate	  persons	  
(Sepper,	  2012,	  2013;	  Corbin,	  2014).	  	  Although	  institutions	  may	  indeed	  have	  an	  ethos	  or	  
a	  code	  of	  ethics,	  this	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  fact	  and	  results	  from	  a	  group’s	  adoption	  of	  certain	  
principles	  and	  values	  as	  that	  ethos.	  	  Ethos	  in	  this	  descriptive	  sense	  is	  qualitatively	  
distinct	  from	  the	  consciousness	  which	  is	  part	  of	  the	  individual’s	  critical	  and	  psychological	  
being.	  	  Asking	  hospitals	  or	  corporate	  persons	  to	  act	  against	  their	  collective	  ethos	  or	  
policy	  means	  asking	  those	  institutions	  to	  act	  against	  a	  rule	  they	  have	  adopted	  in	  a	  law-­‐
like	  process.	  	  It	  does	  not	  entail	  asking	  them	  to	  act	  against	  an	  intimate,	  psychological	  
commitment	  because	  institutions	  cannot	  have	  that	  critical	  faculty.	  	  As	  Sepper	  notes,	  the	  
effect	  of	  asserting	  an	  institutional	  ethos	  will	  often	  be	  to	  downgrade	  the	  consciences	  of	  
individuals	  providing	  care	  within	  that	  institution	  (2012).	  	  For	  Corbin	  the	  idea	  that	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corporations	  could	  be	  exempt	  from	  the	  provision	  of	  lawful	  abortion	  care	  on	  grounds	  of	  
conscience	  is	  part	  of	  ‘abortion	  exceptionalism’,	  and	  should	  not	  be	  legally	  accepted	  
(2014).	  	  	  
	   The	  PLDPA	  frees	  medical	  practitioners,	  nurses	  and	  midwives	  from	  the	  obligation	  
to	  provide	  lawful	  abortion	  care	  on	  grounds	  of	  conscientious	  objection,	  and	  does	  not	  
refer	  explicitly	  to	  hospitals.	  	  The	  exclusion	  of	  hospitals	  as	  corporate	  persons	  from	  the	  
category	  of	  conscientious	  objectors	  has	  some	  support	  in	  ECHR	  jurisprudence	  as	  
companies	  and	  associations	  cannot	  usually	  rely	  on	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  thought,	  
conscience	  and	  belief	  under	  Article	  9	  (Company	  X	  v	  Switzerland	  (1979)	  16	  DR	  85;	  Verein	  
Kontakt-­‐Information-­‐Therapie	  v	  Austria	  (1988)	  57	  DR	  81).	  Campbell	  suggests	  that	  this	  
limit	  should	  be	  read	  literally	  and	  that	  it	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  hospitals	  (as	  distinct	  from	  
companies)	  are	  excluded	  (2011a:	  293).	  	  Rather	  he	  suggests	  that	  the	  test	  is	  whether	  the	  
state	  can	  organize	  the	  health	  service	  is	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  accommodate	  institutional	  CO.	  	  
However,	  I	  think	  that	  his	  interpretation	  goes	  to	  a	  different	  point	  about	  CO	  concerning	  
the	  significance	  of	  its	  limitations.	  	  Here	  I	  make	  a	  prior	  point	  that	  institutions	  are	  
generally	  not	  the	  kind	  of	  legal	  person	  who	  have	  a	  critical	  consciousness	  and	  that	  is	  why	  
they	  should	  not	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  Article	  9	  in	  the	  first	  instance.	  	  	  This	  approach	  is	  
supported	  by	  the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  Colombian	  Constitutional	  court	  in	  Decision	  T-­‐
388/2009,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  hospitals	  cannot	  experience	  intimate	  and	  deeply-­‐rooted	  
convictions	  and	  might	  limit	  the	  freedom	  of	  individual	  employees	  	  (2014:	  44).	  	  But	  it	  is	  
not	  supported	  by	  the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  majority	  in	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  decision	  in	  
‘Hobby	  Lobby’	  (Burwell,	  Secretary	  of	  Health	  and	  Human	  Services	  et	  al	  v	  Hobby	  Lobby	  
	   6	  
Stores	  Inc	  et	  al.	  573	  US__	  (2014),	  nor	  by	  the	  European	  Parliamentary	  Assembly	  
resolution	  1763	  (2010).	  	  ‘Hobby	  Lobby’	  concerned	  a	  decision	  that	  corporate	  employers	  
could	  ‘engage	  in	  religious	  exercise’	  under	  the	  First	  Amendment’s	  guarantee	  of	  freedom	  
of	  religion.	  	  	  The	  capacity	  of	  corporate	  persons	  to	  so	  engage	  was	  crucial	  to	  deciding	  that	  
they	  had	  a	  right	  to	  be	  exempt	  from	  providing	  health	  insurance	  coverage	  to	  employees	  in	  
relation	  to	  certain	  contraceptives.	  	  Resolution	  1763	  protects	  hospitals	  and	  institutions,	  
as	  well	  as	  individuals,	  against	  discrimination	  or	  coercion	  because	  of	  a	  refusal	  to	  perform	  
an	  abortion	  (see	  further	  Campbell,	  2011b).	  	  But	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  Colombian	  
Constitutional	  Court’s	  position	  are	  more	  persuasive	  in	  my	  view	  (see	  further	  Melling	  and	  
Lee,	  2014).	  	  
	   When	  corporate	  persons	  such	  as	  religiously	  run	  hospitals	  have	  considerable	  
institutional	  power,	  it	  is	  even	  more	  important	  to	  interrogate	  any	  claim	  that	  they	  are	  
justified	  in	  refusing	  provision	  of	  lawful	  healthcare	  on	  grounds	  of	  conscience.	  	  The	  Irish	  
legal	  context	  is	  complicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  Article	  44.2.5	  of	  the	  Constitution	  protects	  
the	  right	  of	  every	  religious	  denomination	  to	  manage	  its	  own	  affairs.	  	  	  Some	  
commentators	  have	  argued	  that	  this	  denominational	  autonomy	  might	  apply	  to	  
voluntary	  hospitals	  operating	  under	  a	  religious	  ethos	  (Whyte,	  2013;	  Coen,	  2013).	  	  Coen	  
has	  argued	  that	  requiring	  the	  hospitals	  to	  perform	  abortions	  under	  the	  2013	  Act	  could	  
be	  open	  to	  a	  constitutional	  challenge.	  	  He	  believes	  that	  publicly	  funded	  religious	  
hospitals	  do	  not	  have	  to	  act	  in	  a	  manner	  which	  conflicts	  with	  their	  ethos	  (Coen,	  2013).	  	  
But	  Daly	  has	  argued	  that	  this	  interpretation	  “is	  based	  on	  an	  implausibly	  broad	  
interpretation	  of	  religious	  freedom	  and	  denominational	  autonomy”	  (2013).	  	  According	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to	  Daly,	  denominations	  have	  the	  right	  to	  maintain	  institutions,	  but	  that	  does	  not	  make	  
them	  immune	  from	  public	  regulation	  (see	  further	  Daly,	  2012).	  Daly	  is	  concerned	  with	  
the	  limits	  imposed	  on	  hospitals	  through	  their	  public	  obligations	  to	  provide	  health	  care,	  
an	  issue	  I	  take	  up	  below.	  	  But	  as	  the	  Colombian	  ruling	  helps	  make	  clear,	  there	  is	  a	  prior	  
point:	  Hospitals	  as	  a	  whole	  should	  not	  be	  recognized	  as	  the	  bearers	  of	  CO	  in	  the	  first	  
place,	  and	  ‘denominational	  authority’	  covers	  the	  management	  of	  a	  hospital’s	  affairs	  
according	  to	  a	  descriptive	  account	  of	  its	  ethos.	  	  The	  legal	  interest	  in	  denominational	  
authority	  under	  the	  Irish	  Constitution	  does	  not	  justify	  the	  legal	  recognition	  of	  
institutional	  CO	  since	  CO	  is	  not	  the	  kind	  of	  practice	  that	  fits	  within	  such	  a	  descriptive	  
understanding	  of	  ethos.	  	  Moreover,	  recognizing	  institutional	  conscience	  could	  
undermine	  protection	  of	  the	  consciences	  of	  individual	  employees	  within	  that	  institution.	  	  
	   	  This	  issue	  has	  become	  more	  concrete	  in	  Ireland	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  
PLDPA.	  	  Two	  prominent	  Catholic	  hospitals,	  the	  Mater	  and	  St	  Vincent’s	  are	  named	  in	  the	  
Act	  as	  hospitals	  authorized	  to	  provided	  terminations.	  	  One	  of	  the	  Board	  members	  of	  the	  
Mater,	  Fr.	  Doran,	  stated	  publicly	  that	  he	  was	  concerned	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  Act	  
requiring	  the	  Mater	  to	  perform	  abortions,	  as	  this	  would	  breach	  their	  ethos.	  	  In	  
September	  2013,	  the	  Mater	  announced	  that	  it	  would	  be	  complying	  with	  the	  terms	  of	  
the	  PLDPA	  (Holland,	  2013;	  O’Carroll,	  2013b).	  	  Fr.	  Doran	  has	  since	  resigned	  from	  the	  
Board.	  	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  the	  hospital	  has	  agreed	  to	  abide	  by	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Act	  in	  its	  
provision	  of	  public	  and	  private	  health	  care,	  and	  not	  to	  invoke	  some	  kind	  of	  collective	  CO	  
to	  the	  performance	  of	  life-­‐saving	  terminations	  which	  may	  not	  conform	  with	  Catholic	  
doctrine.	  	  But	  the	  issue	  is	  bound	  to	  continue	  to	  be	  contested	  and	  has	  generated	  a	  great	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deal	  of	  media	  coverage	  and	  public	  commentary,	  including	  from	  an	  anti-­‐choice	  
campaigner	  who	  has	  called	  for	  the	  nuns	  in	  the	  Mater	  to	  take	  a	  test	  case	  (O’Brien,	  2013).	  	  
An	  understanding	  of	  CO	  as	  an	  exercise	  in	  critical	  consciousness	  may	  contribute	  to	  this	  
debate	  by	  explaining	  why	  hospitals	  with	  a	  religious	  ethos	  are	  unlikely	  to	  qualify	  for	  CO.	  	  	  
	  
Good	  faith,	  non-­‐discriminatory	  claimants	  
Two	  other	  sets	  of	  issues	  to	  do	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  claim	  to	  CO	  have	  arisen	  in	  an	  Irish	  
context.	  	  The	  first	  concerns	  the	  genuineness	  of	  the	  objection.	  	  The	  second	  concerns	  
whether	  non-­‐direct	  participation	  in	  abortion	  care	  amounts	  to	  the	  carrying	  out,	  or	  the	  
assistance	  in	  carrying	  out	  of	  abortions	  under	  the	  PLDPA,	  and	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  right	  to	  CO.	  	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  review	  how	  these	  concerns	  may	  play	  out.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  
frame	  such	  concerns	  about	  legitimacy	  is	  by	  asking	  whether	  refusers	  of	  care	  are	  invoking	  
a	  good	  faith,	  non-­‐discriminatory	  objection.	  	  	  	  
	  
Genuineness	  of	  CO	  
Usually	  the	  ‘genuineness’	  of	  a	  refusal	  to	  provide	  abortion	  care	  is	  not	  scrutinized	  in	  itself,	  
but	  refusers	  are	  asked	  to	  identify	  themselves	  and	  to	  give	  reasons	  so	  that	  arrangements	  
to	  accommodate	  the	  conscientious	  refusal	  can	  be	  made.	  	  Conscientious	  refusers	  may	  be	  
distinguished	  from	  ‘obstructors’	  or	  those	  whose	  objection	  falls	  more	  readily	  within	  the	  
category	  of	  civil	  disobedience.	  	  If	  someone	  wants	  to	  obstruct	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  lawful	  
service	  by	  ostensibly	  participating	  in	  it	  but	  refusing	  to	  authorize	  abortion	  on	  the	  legal	  
grounds	  available,	  then	  this	  is	  not	  conscientious	  refusal	  as	  normally	  understood.	  	  Rather	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the	  intention	  is	  to	  frustrate	  the	  system	  and	  the	  normal	  expectation	  is	  that	  this	  person	  
would	  be	  held	  to	  account.	  	  Since	  civil	  disobedience	  is	  about	  drawing	  attention	  to	  an	  
objection	  with	  a	  particular	  law	  by	  disobeying	  it	  and	  inviting	  the	  consequences,	  
obstruction	  is	  closer	  to	  civil	  disobedience	  in	  kind	  than	  it	  is	  to	  conscientious	  objection.	  	  
The	  obstructor	  is	  not	  a	  ‘genuine’	  conscientious	  objector	  because	  she	  does	  not	  wish	  to	  
withdraw	  from	  the	  health	  care	  provision	  to	  which	  she	  objects.	  	  This	  distinction	  may	  be	  
relevant	  in	  responding	  to	  any	  possibility	  that	  medical	  professionals	  may	  ‘obstruct’	  the	  
delivery	  of	  legal	  abortion	  care	  by	  participating	  while	  having	  no	  intention	  of	  approving	  
abortion	  care	  in	  individual	  cases	  (see	  further	  Casey,	  2013).	  	  	  
	   As	  Raz	  has	  pointed	  out,	  recognizing	  a	  right	  to	  object	  “involves	  sanctioning	  some	  
degree	  of	  public	  intrusion	  into	  the	  private	  affairs	  of	  individuals”	  (2009:	  287–8)	  because	  
the	  genuineness	  of	  a	  conscientious	  objector	  needs	  to	  be	  assessed	  to	  prevent	  abuse	  (see	  
also	  Campbell	  2011:	  287).	  If	  someone	  is	  seeking	  to	  rely	  on	  CO	  in	  order	  to	  lessen	  their	  
workload	  or	  because	  they	  would	  rather	  do	  something	  else,	  then	  she	  is	  not	  objecting	  as	  
an	  exercise	  in	  critical	  consciousness	  and	  does	  not	  have	  a	  legitimate	  claim.	  	  Some	  
objectors	  will	  want	  to	  be	  freed	  of	  a	  range	  of	  activities	  which	  they	  associate	  with	  an	  
immoral	  purpose	  on	  grounds	  of	  complicity	  (Campbell,	  2011:	  300).	  	  This	  will	  be	  the	  case	  
even	  if	  others	  think	  that	  associated	  actions	  are	  not	  necessary	  for	  abortion	  care	  and	  
ought	  not	  be	  objectionable	  to	  the	  objector.	  	  In	  a	  sense	  Glasgow	  midwives	  Doogan	  and	  
Wood	  asked	  the	  UK	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  take	  the	  genuineness	  of	  their	  objection	  to	  being	  
complicit	  in	  abortion	  care	  seriously	  when	  they	  supervise,	  delegate	  and	  support	  abortion	  
care	  (Greater	  Glasgow	  Health	  Board	  v	  Doogan	  and	  Wood	  [2014]	  UKSC	  68;	  hereinafter	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Doogan	  and	  Wood:	  para	  12;	  Neal,	  2014;	  see	  further	  Dickens,	  2014:	  229-­‐230).	  	  They	  were	  
unsuccessful	  because	  the	  Court	  ruled	  that	  they	  were	  not	  participating	  in	  a	  "hands-­‐on	  
capacity"	  when	  engaged	  in	  managerial	  and	  supervisory	  tasks.	  However,	  the	  genuineness	  




The	  legal	  distinction	  between	  direct	  and	  indirect	  participation	  in	  health	  care	  is	  also	  
relevant	  to	  considering	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  claim	  to	  CO.	  	  Law	  has	  often	  excluded	  indirect	  
participants	  from	  claiming	  CO	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  their	  participation	  in	  something	  they	  
find	  morally	  objectionable	  has	  to	  be	  direct	  (Fletcher,	  2014:	  130-­‐132).	  	  As	  Sepper	  explains	  
“across	  philosophical	  traditions,	  the	  necessity	  and	  proximity	  of	  the	  objector	  for	  the	  
alleged	  bad	  act	  and	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  act	  are	  central	  to	  moral	  
responsibility”	  (2014:	  726).	  	  Direct	  participants	  have	  a	  legal	  right	  to	  CO	  because	  they	  are	  
proximate	  and	  necessary	  to	  the	  activity,	  and	  because	  the	  consequences	  of	  denying	  
them	  that	  right	  would	  be	  serious.	  	  This	  distinction	  has	  also	  informed	  professional	  
regulation.	  	  The	  British	  Royal	  College	  of	  Nursing’s	  Framework	  on	  the	  Termination	  of	  
Pregnancy	  currently	  provides:	  	  
This	  right	  is	  limited	  only	  to	  the	  active	  participation	  in	  the	  termination	  of	  
pregnancy	  where	  there	  is	  no	  emergency	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  physical	  or	  mental	  
health	  of	  the	  pregnant	  woman…	  Nurses	  and	  midwives	  who	  have	  a	  conscientious	  
objection	  must	  inform	  their	  employer	  at	  the	  earliest	  opportunity.	  Under	  the	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1990	  legislation,	  nurses	  cannot	  refuse	  to	  provide	  nursing	  care	  for	  women,	  before	  
or	  after	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  pregnancy	  (2013:	  7).	  	  
	  
	   On	  this	  view,	  indirect	  participation	  does	  not	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  ‘genuine’	  objection	  
because	  the	  objector	  is	  not	  proximate	  enough	  to	  the	  relevant	  act	  in	  order	  to	  be	  
responsible	  for	  it.	  	  However,	  this	  legal	  and	  policy	  distinction	  has	  been	  coming	  under	  
pressure	  internationally	  as	  those	  who	  believe	  themselves	  complicit	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  
something	  morally	  objectionable	  have	  challenged	  the	  exclusion	  of	  indirect	  participation.	  	  
Sepper	  (2014)	  distinguishes	  between	  what	  she	  calls	  first	  and	  second	  generation	  
conscience	  clauses	  in	  the	  US,	  where	  the	  first	  are	  narrowly	  focused	  on	  certain	  
professions	  and	  acts	  and	  the	  second	  concern	  broader	  protection	  of	  pharmacists	  and	  of	  
information	  and	  referral	  activities.	  	  In	  a	  European	  context,	  this	  legal	  distinction	  has	  
recently	  been	  considered	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Doogan	  and	  
Wood.	  	  Irish	  law	  and	  policy	  has	  not	  explicitly	  considered	  the	  relevance	  of	  this	  distinction	  
to	  any	  great	  extent	  yet	  (Medical	  Council,	  2009:	  16).	  	  But	  it	  informed	  the	  controversy	  
surrounding	  the	  alleged	  right	  of	  pregnancy	  counselors,	  working	  in	  state	  funded	  services	  
contracted	  out	  to	  Catholic	  organisations,	  not	  to	  provide	  clients	  with	  information	  about	  
abortion	  services	  abroad	  (Fletcher	  2013:	  172).	  
	   In	  Doogan	  and	  Wood	  the	  Glasgow	  hospital	  appealed	  against	  the	  decision	  by	  the	  
Inner	  House	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Court	  of	  Session	  that	  indirect	  participation	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
supervision,	  delegation	  and	  support	  of	  staff	  providing	  abortion	  care	  did	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  
right	  to	  conscientious	  objection	  under	  section	  4	  of	  the	  Abortion	  Act,	  1967.	  	  Baroness	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Hale,	  delivering	  the	  unanimous	  judgment	  for	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  identified	  the	  key	  legal	  
issue	  as	  a	  specific	  one	  of	  statutory	  interpretation,	  rather	  than	  human	  rights	  or	  
employment	  equality	  analysis.	  Ultimately	  she	  ruled	  that	  participation	  under	  section	  4	  
would	  not	  on	  any	  view	  cover	  things	  done	  before	  the	  course	  of	  treatment	  began,	  such	  as	  
making	  the	  booking	  before	  the	  first	  drug	  is	  administered.	  	  Moreover,	  a	  narrow	  meaning	  
of	  actually	  taking	  part	  in	  a	  “hands-­‐on	  capacity”	  was	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  been	  in	  
contemplation	  by	  Parliament	  when	  the	  1967	  Act	  was	  passed	  (para	  38).	  	  Therefore,	  
managerial	  and	  supervisory	  tasks,	  including	  delegation,	  will	  not	  usually	  be	  covered	  by	  
“participation”.	  	  Support	  tasks	  will	  not	  be	  covered	  unless	  they	  involve	  assistance	  which	  
entails	  actual	  hands-­‐on	  participation	  in	  the	  termination.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  SC	  decision	  
is	  authority	  for	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  legal	  distinction	  between	  direct	  and	  indirect	  
participation	  cannot	  be	  considered	  solely	  from	  the	  subjective	  perspective	  of	  the	  
conscientious	  objector.	  	  The	  question	  of	  participation	  ought	  to	  be	  decided	  objectively	  in	  
terms	  of	  whether	  an	  action	  is	  actual,	  hands-­‐on	  participation	  in	  termination	  of	  
pregnancy.	  This	  approach	  is	  consistent	  with	  a	  court	  having	  regard	  to	  the	  proper	  
objectives	  underpinning	  the	  lawful	  recognition	  of	  CO,	  that	  is	  the	  legal	  protection	  of	  
critical	  consciousness	  within	  a	  harm	  prevention	  framework.	  	  	  
	   The	  question	  of	  whether	  indirect	  participants	  merit	  recognition	  as	  conscientious	  
objectors	  is	  best	  decided	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  good	  faith	  genuineness	  of	  their	  claim	  and	  
secondly	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  reasonableness	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  non-­‐discriminatory.	  	  Some	  
kinds	  of	  indirect	  abortion	  care	  (e.g.	  making	  arrangements	  for	  a	  woman	  who	  has	  decided	  
to	  terminate	  her	  pregnancy,	  or	  handling	  foetal	  remains)	  may	  legitimately	  give	  rise	  to	  a	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CO	  because	  the	  objector	  genuinely	  believes	  that	  they	  would	  be	  complicit	  in	  something	  
morally	  objectionable	  and	  may	  suffer	  a	  psychological	  harm	  as	  a	  result.	  	  This	  could	  be	  a	  
belief	  that	  while	  a	  woman	  is	  entitled	  to	  make	  reproductive	  decisions	  and	  is	  entitled	  to	  
reproductive	  healthcare,	  that	  professional	  does	  not	  want	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  
destruction	  of	  embryonic	  or	  foetal	  life	  because	  they	  believe	  that	  life	  has	  moral	  value	  
from	  conception.	  	  As	  Kantymir	  and	  McLeod	  (2014)	  argue	  however,	  genuineness	  should	  
not	  be	  a	  sufficient	  condition	  because	  reasons	  although	  genuine	  may	  be	  based	  on	  false	  
information	  or	  they	  may	  be	  normatively	  problematic.	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  law,	  we	  should	  
respond	  to	  this	  concern	  by	  adopting	  the	  regulatory	  assumption	  that	  a	  claim	  to	  CO	  is	  
genuine,	  unless	  there	  is	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  otherwise.	  	  The	  belief	  that	  indirect	  forms	  of	  
abortion	  care	  would	  make	  the	  carer	  complicit	  may	  be	  unreasonable,	  and	  if	  so	  they	  
ought	  not	  be	  recognized	  as	  grounding	  a	  CO	  in	  law.	  	  Even	  if	  the	  objection	  is	  reasonable	  in	  
the	  sense	  of	  being	  non-­‐discriminatory,	  another	  question	  (discussed	  below),	  is	  whether	  
other	  interests	  such	  as	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  woman	  limit	  the	  genuine	  and	  reasonable	  
objection	  either	  by	  trumping	  it	  or	  by	  imposing	  conditions	  on	  its	  execution.	  	  	  	  
	   Objections	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  abortion	  information	  or	  genetic	  testing	  to	  a	  
pregnant	  woman	  on	  grounds	  that	  it	  may	  contribute	  to	  an	  abortion	  decision	  and	  render	  
the	  provider	  complicit	  in	  that	  decision	  should	  not	  stand	  because	  that	  may	  be	  an	  
empirically	  false	  claim.	  	  For	  example,	  where	  an	  abortion	  decision	  has	  not	  been	  made,	  
the	  objection	  to	  the	  test	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  could	  lead	  to	  abortion,	  is	  arguably	  
factually	  incorrect.	  	  Results	  of	  a	  genetic	  test	  provide	  a	  woman	  with	  information	  about	  
her	  pregnancy.	  	  This	  information	  may	  contribute	  to	  an	  abortion	  decision,	  but	  it	  is	  equally	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possible	  that	  it	  may	  not.	  	  Legal	  support	  for	  this	  approach	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Colombian	  
Court’s	  opinion	  that	  indirect	  participation	  cannot	  ground	  CO	  	  “because	  of	  the	  difficulty	  
in	  determining	  how	  their	  work	  	  interferes	  	  with	  	  legitimate	  	  moral,	  	  philosophical	  	  or	  	  
religious	  	  convictions”	  (para	  5.1).	  	  Before	  an	  abortion	  occurs,	  or	  before	  an	  abortion	  
decision	  is	  made,	  we	  cannot	  know	  if	  care	  which	  provides	  a	  woman	  with	  information	  
about	  her	  pregnancy	  and	  which	  has	  abortion	  as	  one	  possible	  outcome,	  will	  contribute	  to	  
abortion	  or	  not,	  and	  we	  cannot	  say	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact	  if	  the	  objector	  is	  complicit	  or	  not.	  	  
	   The	  issue	  arose	  in	  RR	  v.	  Poland	  (2011)	  53	  EHRR	  31	  (hereinafter	  RR),	  but	  was	  not	  
definitively	  addressed	  by	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (ECtHR).	  	  The	  applicant	  
argued	  that	  a	  refusal	  to	  provide	  a	  diagnostic	  test	  because	  that	  test	  might	  lead	  to	  
abortion	  was	  not	  justified	  by	  CO.	  	  In	  particular	  her	  lawyers	  argued	  that	  	  
	  
[U]nder	  the	  established	  medical	  doctrine	  of	  informed	  consent,	  patients	  should	  
be	  informed	  of	  all	  risks,	  benefits	  and	  alternatives	  to	  treatment	  in	  order	  to	  make	  
a	  free	  and	  informed	  decision	  in	  their	  best	  interest.	  Refusing	  to	  diagnose	  a	  
potentially	  serious	  illness	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  diagnosis	  might	  subsequently	  lead	  
to	  a	  therapeutic	  act	  to	  which	  the	  doctor	  concerned	  objected	  on	  grounds	  of	  
conscience	  was	  incompatible	  with	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  conscientious	  objection	  
(para	  174).	  	  	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  patients	  who	  may	  be	  considering	  abortion	  are	  lawfully	  entitled	  to	  
information	  and	  diagnostic	  tests	  about	  their	  pregnancy.	  	  Refusing	  to	  provide	  such	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information	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  is	  an	  aspect	  of	  abortion	  care	  is	  more	  than	  is	  
necessary	  to	  protect	  the	  care	  provider’s	  conscience.	  	  At	  the	  moment,	  pregnant	  women	  
receiving	  care	  in	  Irish	  hospitals	  and	  crisis	  pregnancy	  centres,	  may	  not	  be	  getting	  full	  
information	  about	  their	  pregnancy	  options.	  	  The	  women	  and	  couples	  of	  Termination	  for	  
Medical	  Reasons	  have	  discussed	  ‘feeling	  abandoned’	  by	  the	  Irish	  health	  care	  system	  on	  
discovery	  that	  there	  were	  serious	  anomalies	  with	  their	  pregnancies	  (O’Carroll,	  2013a).	  	  
Good	  quality	  information	  about	  pregnancy	  options,	  including	  the	  availability	  of	  abortion	  
care	  abroad,	  is	  provided	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  cases	  (Fletcher,	  2013a).	  	  In	  other	  instances,	  
women’s	  access	  to	  abortion	  information	  is	  impeded	  either	  by	  the	  chilling	  effect	  of	  
restrictions	  under	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Information	  (Services	  outside	  the	  state	  for	  
termination	  of	  pregnancies)	  Act,	  1995,	  or	  because	  relevant	  professionals	  are	  exercising	  
a	  version	  of	  conscientious	  objection.	  	  I	  cannot	  review	  the	  issue	  in	  detail	  here,	  but	  the	  
point	  I	  want	  to	  make	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  that	  if	  professionals	  are	  denying	  
or	  delaying	  women	  access	  to	  information	  about	  their	  pregnancies	  out	  of	  a	  conscientious	  
objection	  to	  abortion,	  that	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  a	  legitimate	  claim	  to	  CO	  because	  it	  makes	  
incorrect	  assumptions	  about	  what	  women	  will	  do	  with	  that	  information.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Some	  forms	  of	  pre-­‐abortion	  care	  ought	  not	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  CO	  because	  it	  will	  be	  
unreasonable	  to	  deny	  pregnant	  women	  health	  information	  to	  which	  pregnant	  woman	  
are	  normally	  entitled.	  Denying	  such	  information	  amounts	  to	  treating	  abortion-­‐
contemplating	  women	  as	  if	  they	  are	  not	  entitled	  to	  basic	  healthcare	  information,	  
information	  which	  other	  patients	  receive.	  	  Objections	  which	  refuse	  to	  provide	  care	  for	  
discriminatory	  or	  other	  normatively	  problematic	  reasons	  should	  not	  be	  legally	  
	   16	  
recognized	  as	  engaging	  a	  right	  to	  CO	  (Medical	  Council,	  2009:	  16;	  General	  Medical	  
Council,	  2013b:para	  8).	  	  Post	  abortion	  care	  is	  particularly	  likely	  to	  fall	  into	  this	  category	  
because	  here	  the	  objector	  wants	  to	  withhold	  the	  care	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  woman	  
has	  had	  an	  abortion.	  	  At	  this	  point	  it	  is	  not	  reasonable	  to	  understand	  this	  care	  as	  
complicit	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  abortion	  because	  the	  abortion	  has	  happened.	  	  Rather	  here	  
the	  refusal	  would	  be	  unjustifiably	  discriminatory	  because	  it	  is	  denying	  healthcare	  to	  
women	  who	  have	  had	  abortions	  because	  of	  who	  they	  are,	  and	  not	  because	  of	  the	  action	  
they	  may	  take.	  	  This	  might	  be	  the	  best	  interpretation	  of	  national	  laws	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Italy	  
which	  have,	  to	  date,	  explicitly	  excluded	  indirect	  involvement	  from	  the	  scope	  of	  CO	  
(Doogan	  and	  Wood,	  2014;	  European	  Social	  Committee,	  2014).	  	  They	  are	  seeking	  to	  
exclude	  those	  actions	  such	  as	  the	  non-­‐provision	  of	  post-­‐abortion	  care	  which	  amount	  to	  
discrimination	  against	  women	  who	  have	  had	  abortions	  as	  less	  worthy	  of	  healthcare	  than	  
other	  women	  or	  men.	  	  Some	  refusals	  of	  abortion	  care	  however,	  such	  as	  the	  supervision	  
of	  abortion	  care	  in	  Doogan	  and	  Wood,	  are	  forms	  of	  indirect	  participation	  which	  are	  not	  
obviously	  excluded	  as	  direct	  discrimination,	  but	  may	  be	  have	  to	  be	  legally	  limited	  in	  
order	  to	  avoid	  harm	  to	  pregnant	  people.	  	  	  
	   	  
Harm	  reduction	  as	  a	  limit	  on	  conscientious	  objection	  
Conscientious	  objection	  is	  a	  limited	  and	  not	  an	  absolute	  right	  (Pichon	  and	  Sajous	  
v.	  France	  (2001)	  App.	  No.	  49853/99,	  ECtHR;	  Lamacková,	  2008;	  Daly,	  2013).	  Most	  legal	  
rights	  are	  limited	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  rights	  of	  others	  and	  public	  interests,	  but	  more	  
extensive	  limitations	  are	  probably	  justifiable	  in	  the	  case	  of	  CO.	  This	  is	  because	  CO	  arises	  
out	  of	  a	  context	  where	  there	  is	  usually	  a	  lawful	  obligation	  on	  the	  objector	  to	  provide	  a	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form	  of	  healthcare,	  which	  conflicts	  with	  her	  conscience.	  	  Even	  though	  it	  is	  trite	  law	  that	  
CO	  is	  a	  limited	  right,	  in	  practice	  health	  care	  professionals	  have	  been	  known	  to	  act	  as	  if	  
their	  CO	  is	  absolute.	  	  The	  ECtHR	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  criticize	  the	  doctors	  in	  P	  and	  S	  v.	  Poland	  
(2012)	  App.	  No.	  57375/08	  (hereinafter	  'P	  and	  S')	  for	  effectively	  assuming	  an	  absolute	  
right	  to	  CO	  (para	  108).	  	  A	  more	  contested	  legal	  issue	  is	  not	  the	  fact	  of	  limitations	  per	  se,	  
but	  the	  scope	  of	  such	  limitations	  and	  the	  kinds	  of	  harms	  that	  count	  in	  limiting	  CO.	  	  I	  will	  
first	  examine	  the	  legal	  meaning	  of	  harm	  in	  this	  context	  (see	  further	  Erdman,	  2011;	  
Women’s	  Link	  Worldwide,	  2012)	  before	  considering	  the	  kinds	  of	  limits	  on	  CO	  that	  harm	  
prevention	  entails.	   
	  	  
The	  scope	  of	  harms	  	  
Most	  CO	  laws,	  including	  section	  17	  of	  the	  PLDPA,	  specify	  that	  healthcare	  professionals	  
cannot	  rely	  on	  CO	  to	  deny	  a	  woman	  emergency	  life-­‐saving	  abortion	  care	  (see	  further	  
Department	  of	  Health,	  2014:	  40).	  	  Most	  CO	  laws	  also	  require	  timely	  referral	  to	  another	  
provider	  if	  CO	  is	  being	  claimed	  in	  non-­‐	  emergency	  situations.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  kinds	  of	  
legal	  limits	  on	  CO	  imply	  a	  recognition	  that	  CO	  could	  harm	  pregnant	  women	  in	  a	  variety	  
of	  ways.	  	  How	  do	  we	  decide	  which	  harms	  count	  when	  considering	  the	  justifiable	  limits	  
on	  CO?	  When	  abortion	  law	  recognizes	  interests	  which	  may	  justify	  a	  termination	  of	  
pregnancy	  it	  is	  recognising	  interests	  which	  may	  be	  harmed	  by	  the	  exercise	  of	  CO.	  	  
Therefore,	  the	  criteria	  for	  harms	  which	  limit	  CO	  are	  provided	  by	  the	  criteria	  for	  lawful	  
termination.	  	  These	  will	  vary	  between	  legal	  regimes	  but	  typically	  range	  over	  women’s	  
interests	  in	  life,	  health,	  well-­‐being,	  self-­‐determination,	  dignity,	  freedom	  from	  degrading	  
treatment	  and	  equality.	  	  If	  abortion	  laws	  recognize	  grounds	  for	  lawful	  abortion	  such	  as	  
risk	  of	  injury	  to	  a	  woman’s	  health	  and	  well-­‐being,	  or	  a	  compromising	  of	  her	  self-­‐
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determination	  and	  dignity,	  then	  these	  are	  legally	  recognized	  harms	  which	  limit	  the	  
exercise	  of	  CO	  (see	  further	  IPPF-­‐En	  v	  Italy,	  2012).	  The	  harms	  which	  should	  count	  legally	  
in	  calculating	  whether	  CO	  is	  limited	  in	  a	  particular	  case	  are	  all	  the	  harms	  anticipated	  by	  
the	  legal	  measure	  permitting	  abortion	  and	  conscientious	  objection,	  not	  just	  the	  harm	  
that	  is	  a	  life-­‐threatening	  emergency.	  	  In	  an	  Irish	  context	  the	  harm	  of	  risk	  to	  life,	  including	  
suicide	  risk,	  is	  recognized	  as	  a	  harm	  which	  grounds	  a	  legal	  right	  to	  abortion	  by	  the	  2013	  
Act,	  and	  operates	  to	  limit	  the	  objections	  of	  those	  who	  disagree	  with	  abortion	  being	  
provided	  on	  such	  grounds	  (see	  further	  Murray,	  2013;	  Taylor,	  2015;	  de	  Londras,	  2015).	  	  
Those	  who	  object	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  abortion	  on	  grounds	  of	  suicide	  risk	  do	  not	  have	  an	  
absolute	  right	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  to	  such	  provision.	  	  Rather	  legal	  recognition	  of	  
suicide	  risk	  as	  a	  ground	  for	  abortion	  means	  that	  any	  relevant	  CO	  has	  to	  be	  managed	  
without	  becoming	  a	  barrier	  to	  lawful	  access	  on	  this	  ground.	  
	   A	  second	  issue	  is	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  abortion	  law	  may	  not	  be	  settled	  in	  relation	  to	  
particular	  kinds	  of	  harms.	  	  At	  present	  the	  only	  harm,	  which	  is	  explicitly	  recognized	  as	  
justifying	  lawful	  abortion	  in	  Ireland,	  is	  the	  harm	  of	  a	  real	  and	  substantial	  risk	  to	  a	  
woman’s	  life	  including	  the	  risk	  of	  self-­‐destruction	  (Taylor,	  2015).	  	  However,	  it	  is	  arguable	  
that	  the	  Irish	  courts	  have	  not	  fully	  considered	  either	  the	  impact	  of	  women’s	  ECHR	  rights,	  
which	  now	  inform	  Irish	  domestic	  law	  (Egan	  et	  al,	  2014);	  the	  proper	  scope	  of	  the	  legal	  
term	  ‘unborn’	  in	  the	  Constitution;	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  40.3.3’s	  reference	  to	  equality	  
between	  woman	  and	  ‘unborn’;	  or,	  the	  usual	  legal	  limits	  on	  the	  right	  to	  life.	  	  Although	  I	  
cannot	  elaborate	  the	  argument	  fully	  here	  (see	  Fletcher	  1998;	  2008;	  2013b),	  it	  is	  possible	  
that	  a	  Court	  could	  expand	  the	  categories	  of	  lawful	  abortion	  in	  a	  particular	  fact	  situation	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and	  in	  light	  of	  lawful	  interests	  which	  were	  not	  in	  play	  when	  Attorney	  General	  v	  X	  (1992)	  
1	  IR	  1	  was	  decided.	  	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  not	  settled	  yet	  whether	  carrying	  a	  foetus	  with	  a	  
fatal	  abnormality	  against	  a	  woman’s	  better	  judgment	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  harm	  which	  could	  
justify	  abortion.	  	  	  Although	  the	  current	  Attorney	  General	  does	  not	  agree	  (Kearns,	  2015),	  
it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  ‘right	  to	  life	  of	  the	  unborn’	  may	  not	  be	  engaged	  in	  such	  
circumstances	  (Schweppe	  and	  Spain,	  2013).	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  carrying	  such	  a	  pregnancy	  
against	  one’s	  will	  is	  a	  form	  of	  inhuman	  and	  degrading	  treatment	  justifying	  access	  to	  
lawful	  abortion	  (RR;	  KL	  v	  Peru	  (UNHRC)	  CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003;	  Centre	  for	  
Reproductive	  Rights,	  2014a;	  Centre	  for	  Reproductive	  Rights,	  2014b).	  	  This	  means	  that	  it	  
is	  also	  possible	  to	  invoke	  these	  harms	  as	  harms	  which	  may	  legally	  limit	  CO	  when	  
contributing	  to	  the	  development	  of	  law	  and	  policy	  on	  CO	  in	  Ireland.	  	  	  
	   Harms	  which	  are	  explicitly	  recognized	  as	  legally	  justifying	  abortion	  ought	  to	  be	  
recognised	  as	  harms	  which	  limit	  the	  exercise	  of	  CO.	  	  Given	  that	  the	  boundaries	  of	  legally	  
recognised	  harms	  shift	  through	  argument	  and	  contestation,	  it	  is	  always	  possible	  that	  the	  
category	  of	  harm	  that	  legally	  limits	  CO	  will	  be	  expanded	  or	  restricted.	  	  Even	  if	  the	  issue	  
of	  what	  counts	  as	  harm	  is	  answered,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  question	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  limit	  such	  
a	  harm	  may	  put	  on	  CO.	  	  In	  the	  section	  that	  follows	  I	  distinguish	  between	  legal	  
recognition	  of	  harm	  reduction	  as	  a	  trump	  on	  CO	  and	  as	  a	  condition	  on	  CO.	  	  Harm	  
reduction	  operates	  as	  a	  trump	  on	  CO	  when	  the	  right	  to	  CO	  is	  outweighed	  by	  the	  right	  
underpinning	  access	  to	  abortion.	  	  Harm	  reduction	  imposes	  conditions	  on	  the	  exercise	  of	  
any	  right	  to	  CO	  by	  requiring	  the	  objector	  to	  observe	  certain	  obligations	  e.g.	  referral	  that	  
arise	  from	  the	  refusal	  to	  provide	  care.	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Limits	  on	  CO	  as	  trumps	  or	  conditions	  
When	  a	  CO	  law,	  such	  as	  section	  17	  of	  the	  PLDPA,	  specifies	  that	  health	  professionals	  
cannot	  rely	  on	  CO	  to	  deny	  a	  woman	  emergency	  life-­‐saving	  abortion	  care,	  it	  is	  
recognizing	  that	  any	  prima	  facie	  right	  to	  CO	  will	  be	  trumped	  by	  the	  duty	  to	  reduce	  an	  
imminent	  threat	  to	  the	  woman’s	  life.	  	  It	  is	  not	  that	  the	  only	  harm	  which	  limits	  CO	  is	  a	  
threat	  to	  a	  woman’s	  life.	  	  Rather	  the	  effect	  of	  this	  threat	  of	  substantial	  harm	  is	  to	  act	  as	  
a	  trump.	  	  The	  circumstances	  which	  trigger	  such	  a	  trumping	  of	  CO	  will	  usually	  be	  rare	  
given	  that	  there	  must	  be	  no	  other	  way	  to	  accommodate	  the	  woman’s	  interest	  in	  
survival.	  	  In	  many	  circumstances,	  harm	  prevention	  will	  operate	  to	  impose	  conditions	  
(rather	  than	  trumps)	  on	  CO	  so	  that	  the	  objector	  may	  only	  object	  or	  commit	  
conscientiously	  when	  certain	  conditions	  are	  met.	  	  
	   Referral	  obligations,	  including	  those	  within	  section	  17	  PLDPA,	  are	  best	  
understood	  as	  conditions	  that	  are	  put	  on	  CO	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  harm	  to	  the	  woman	  by	  
delaying	  or	  inhibiting	  her	  access	  to	  lawful	  healthcare.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  limiting	  of	  CO	  may	  
translate	  into	  a	  series	  of	  standards	  and	  obligations,	  which	  objectors	  and	  the	  public	  
health	  authorities	  which	  employ	  them,	  must	  meet	  (see	  further	  Campbell,	  2009:	  293;	  
Dickens,	  2014:	  229).	  In	  effect,	  they	  should	  show	  that	  they	  are	  only	  breaching	  their	  
duties	  to	  provide	  health	  care	  as	  far	  as	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  their	  critical	  
consciousness.	  	  The	  emphasis	  on	  the	  need	  to	  guarantee	  access	  and	  eliminate	  any	  
additional	  barriers	  that	  may	  arise	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  CO	  (or	  its	  equivalent)	  is	  evident	  in	  
the	  ECtHR’s	  approach.	  	  This	  means	  that	  is	  for	  the	  physician	  and	  not	  the	  patient	  to	  meet	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the	  conditions.	  	  Recognised	  conditions,	  which	  implement	  the	  duty	  to	  provide	  
unobstructed	  access	  to	  lawful	  abortion	  care,	  include	  referral,	  timeliness,	  adequate	  
staffing	  and	  procedural	  regularity.	  	  	  
	   National	  laws	  and	  policies	  commonly	  recognize	  an	  objector’s	  obligation	  to	  refer	  
the	  patient	  to	  another	  professional	  who	  will	  treat	  her	  (GMC,	  2013a:	  para	  52;	  T-­‐
388/2009:	  34;	  Doogan	  and	  Wood	  2014:	  para	  40;	  Dickens	  2014,	  230).	  	  Westenson	  argues	  
that	  a	  European	  regulatory	  standard	  of	  requiring	  the	  securing	  of	  referrals	  has	  been	  
established	  as	  a	  result	  to	  the	  ECtHR	  decisions	  in	  RR	  and	  P	  and	  S	  (2013).	  In	  RR	  the	  failure	  
to	  refer	  for	  genetic	  testing,	  which	  was	  required	  under	  domestic	  legislation,	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  
breach	  of	  the	  applicant’s	  rights	  to	  freedom	  from	  inhuman	  and	  degrading	  treatment	  
(protected	  by	  Article	  3)	  and	  to	  private	  and	  family	  life	  (protected	  by	  Article	  	  8).	  	  In	  P	  and	  S	  
the	  failure	  to	  provide	  a	  referral	  for	  abortion	  was	  part	  of	  the	  applicants’	  evidence	  that	  
they	  had	  not	  been	  provided	  with	  an	  effective	  means	  to	  exercise	  their	  rights	  under	  
Articles	  8	  and	  3	  (para	  81).	  	  Moreover,	  these	  failures	  to	  refer	  occurred	  in	  a	  context	  where	  
domestic	  law	  imposed	  “on	  the	  doctor	  an	  obligation	  to	  refer	  the	  patient	  to	  another	  
physician	  competent	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  same	  service”	  (para	  107).	  	  The	  Health	  Service	  
Executive	  has	  an	  obligation	  to	  ensure	  that	  objectors	  do	  refer	  women	  who	  have	  a	  lawful	  
right	  to	  abortion	  on	  to	  other	  professionals	  in	  a	  timely	  manner.	  	  	  	  	  
	   The	  delays	  experienced	  by	  RR	  and	  by	  P	  and	  S	  in	  trying	  to	  claim	  a	  lawful	  right	  to	  
abortion	  were	  clear	  breaches	  of	  the	  standard	  of	  timeliness	  in	  access	  that	  is	  also	  required	  
as	  a	  consequence	  of	  CO.	  	  	  In	  RR,	  it	  was	  8	  weeks	  after	  the	  request,	  and	  beyond	  the	  lawful	  
time	  period	  for	  abortion,	  before	  she	  received	  the	  genetic	  test	  results.	  	  Secondly,	  the	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Court	  clearly	  saw	  the	  “procrastination,	  confusion	  and	  lack	  of	  proper	  counseling	  and	  
information	  given	  to	  the	  applicant”	  in	  determining	  whether	  she	  should	  have	  access	  to	  
genetic	  testing	  (para	  153)	  as	  unnecessary	  barriers	  to	  access.	  	  Similarly	  in	  finding	  that	  P	  
and	  S’s	  ECHR	  rights	  were	  breached,	  the	  Court	  stated:	  	  
The	  events	  surrounding	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  first	  applicant’s	  access	  to	  legal	  
abortion	  were	  marred	  by	  procrastination	  and	  confusion.	  The	  applicants	  were	  
given	  misleading	  and	  contradictory	  information.	  They	  did	  not	  receive	  
appropriate	  and	  objective	  medical	  counselling	  which	  would	  have	  due	  regard	  to	  
their	  own	  views	  and	  wishes.	  No	  set	  procedure	  was	  available	  to	  them	  under	  
which	  they	  could	  have	  their	  views	  heard	  and	  properly	  taken	  into	  consideration	  
with	  a	  modicum	  of	  procedural	  fairness	  (para	  108).	  	  	  
	  
The	  Court	  also	  noted	  that	  timeliness	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  lawful	  health	  care	  was	  even	  more	  
important	  in	  the	  context	  of	  pregnancy	  (para	  111).	  	  The	  need	  to	  provide	  lawful	  abortion	  
care	  in	  a	  timely	  manner	  operates	  as	  another	  reason	  why	  it	  may	  be	  illegitimate	  for	  
hospitals,	  rather	  than	  individuals,	  to	  refuse	  the	  provision	  of	  abortion	  care	  on	  grounds	  of	  
their	  institutional	  ethos.	  	  In	  order	  to	  meet	  a	  timeliness	  requirement,	  the	  hospital	  would	  
have	  to	  show	  that	  another	  care	  provider	  at	  another	  institution	  could	  provide	  the	  lawful	  
abortion	  without	  undue	  delay.	  	  In	  the	  Irish	  context	  where	  abortion	  is	  only	  lawful	  when	  it	  
is	  life-­‐saving,	  it	  will	  be	  very	  difficult	  for	  a	  hospital	  to	  show	  that	  transfer	  to	  another	  
hospital	  meets	  the	  appropriate	  standard	  of	  timeliness.	  
	   The	  complaint	  against	  Italy	  raised	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  condition	  –	  adequate	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staffing	  -­‐	  on	  the	  practice	  of	  conscientious	  objection	  (IPPF-­‐EN,	  2012;	  European	  
Committee	  of	  Social	  Rights,	  2014).	  	  The	  successful	  argument	  here	  was	  that	  the	  state	  was	  
failing	  to	  deliver	  appropriate	  standards	  of	  safe	  and	  lawful	  abortion	  because	  there	  was	  a	  
dearth	  of	  personnel	  willing	  to	  provide	  abortion	  care	  in	  public	  hospitals.	  As	  a	  result	  the	  
Committee	  decided	  that	  Italy	  had	  breached	  Article	  11	  of	  the	  European	  Social	  Charter,	  
which	  protects	  the	  right	  to	  protection	  of	  health,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  right	  to	  non-­‐
discriminaton,	  protected	  by	  Article	  E.	  	  The	  failure	  to	  regulate	  CO	  had	  contributed	  to	  the	  
low	  number	  of	  abortion	  providers,	  which	  put	  a	  barrier	  in	  the	  way	  of	  women’s	  access	  to	  
lawful	  abortion,	  making	  the	  whole	  safe	  and	  timely	  service	  unsustainable.	  	  As	  Raz	  
observes	  “The	  conscientious	  exemption	  from	  a	  duty	  to	  participate	  in	  administering	  the	  
right	  is	  allowed	  because,	  and	  so	  long	  as,	  it	  does	  not	  threaten	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  
service.”	  (2013:	  3)	  This	  understanding	  is	  also	  supported	  by	  the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  
Colombian	  Constitutional	  Court	  in	  Decision	  T-­‐388/2009	  (2014).	  	  The	  Court	  was	  
unequivocal	  in	  stating	  that	  the	  rights	  of	  pregnant	  women	  were	  not	  protected	  when	  the	  
State	  or	  the	  governmental	  system	  responsible	  for	  healthcare	  insurance	  (EPS)	  fails	  to	  
ensure	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  sufficient	  number	  of	  health	  care	  professionals	  (section	  5.1).	  	  
	   The	  need	  to	  prevent	  harm	  places	  formal	  as	  well	  as	  substantive	  limits	  on	  CO.	  	  
Regulators	  need	  to	  ensure	  that	  proper	  procedures	  are	  in	  place	  in	  order	  to	  guide	  the	  
exercise	  of	  CO	  and	  allow	  objectors	  protection	  of	  their	  critical	  consciousness	  while	  
ensuring	  that	  public	  health	  and	  women’s	  interests	  are	  appropriately	  protected.	  	  
Westenson	  argues	  that	  a	  European	  regulatory	  standard	  of	  requiring	  refusals	  in	  writing	  
has	  been	  established	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  ECtHR	  decisions	  in	  RR	  and	  P	  and	  S	  (2013).	  	  This	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documentation	  should	  include	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  refusal	  and	  an	  appropriate	  referral.	  	  
The	  Colombian	  Constitutional	  Court	  provided	  some	  further	  guidance	  on	  the	  standard	  
required	  of	  refusals	  when	  it	  specified	  that	  the	  objector	  must	  explain	  why	  “performing	  
the	  abortion	  in	  this	  specific	  case	  goes	  against	  her	  most	  intimate	  convictions”	  and	  notes	  
that	  “general	  language	  presented	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  group	  will	  not	  suffice,	  nor	  objections	  
presented	  by	  any	  person	  other	  than	  the	  person	  who	  is	  conscientiously	  objecting”	  (T-­‐
388/2009,	  2014:	  43).	  This	  provides	  a	  procedural	  means	  for	  enabling	  regulators	  to	  check	  
for	  bad	  faith	  and	  discriminatory	  reasons.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
Struggles	  for	  social	  justice	  in	  neighbourhoods	  the	  world	  over	  have	  emphasized	  the	  need	  
to	  differentiate	  between	  claims	  to	  freedom	  and	  conscience.	  	  A	  hospital’s	  public	  
statement	  that	  it	  will	  not	  allow	  abortion	  to	  be	  performed	  on	  its	  premises,	  is	  not	  the	  
same	  claim	  as	  that	  of	  the	  individual	  midwife	  who	  refuses	  to	  perform	  an	  abortion,	  but	  
continues	  to	  care	  for	  her	  patients	  otherwise.	  Moreover	  if	  that	  hospital	  takes	  public	  
funding	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  but	  asserts	  the	  private	  values	  of	  a	  particular	  religion	  or	  secular	  
ethos	  on	  the	  other,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  critical	  expression	  of	  moral	  freedom,	  but	  a	  kind	  of	  
macho	  politics.	  	  Such	  a	  hospital	  is	  saying	  that	  it	  is	  entitled	  to	  public	  funding	  and	  state	  
support,	  but	  is	  not	  publicly	  accountable.	  	  Institutional	  power	  needs	  to	  be	  revealed	  for	  
what	  it	  is,	  not	  accepted	  on	  its	  own	  terms	  (see	  further:	  McGuinness	  and	  Thomson,	  2015).	  	  
Similarly,	  the	  articulation	  of	  a	  doctrinal	  religious	  viewpoint,	  which	  has	  long	  been	  
institutionalized,	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  critical	  moral	  view	  which	  stands	  
	   25	  
against	  the	  legal	  status	  quo	  perhaps	  at	  some	  personal	  cost.	  	  We	  do	  a	  disservice	  to	  the	  
many	  moral	  and	  religious	  traditions	  which	  have	  struggled	  against	  disadvantage	  with	  few	  
resources,	  if	  we	  accept	  dominant	  religious	  powers’	  efforts	  to	  characterize	  themselves	  as	  
marginal	  and	  weak.	  	  Conscientious	  objectors	  ought	  to	  be	  recognized,	  but	  do	  need	  to	  be	  
held	  accountable	  to	  public	  obligations	  to	  prevent	  harm.	  	  This	  is	  part	  of	  the	  struggle	  to	  
preserve	  critical	  spaces	  against,	  and	  within,	  institutional	  power	  in	  its	  new	  and	  varied	  




Campbell,	  Mark	  (2011a)	  ‘Conscientious	  objection,	  health	  care	  and	  Article	  9	  of	  the	  European	  
Court	  of	  Human	  Rights’	  Medical	  Law	  International	  11:	  284-­‐304	  
	  
Campbell,	  Mark	  (2011b)	  ‘Conscientious	  objection	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe’,	  Medical	  Law	  
Review	  19:	  467-­‐475	  
	  
Casey,	  Patricia	  (2013),	  Submission	  to	  the	  Public	  Hearings	  on	  the	  Implementation	  of	  the	  
Government	  Decision	  following	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  Expert	  Group	  Report	  into	  matters	  relating	  




	   26	  
Centre	  for	  Reproductive	  Rights	  (2014a)	  Abandoned	  and	  Stigmatised:	  The	  Impact	  of	  the	  Irish	  




Centre	  for	  Reproductive	  Rights	  (2014b),	  Centre	  for	  Reproductive	  Rights	  brings	  second	  case	  
against	  Ireland’s	  Abortion	  laws	  to	  United	  Nations	  http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-­‐
room/CRR-­‐brings-­‐second-­‐Ireland-­‐case	  
	  
Coen,	  Mark	  (2013)	  ‘Abortion	  Law	  may	  run	  Counter	  to	  Constitution’	  The	  Irish	  Times	  8	  August.	  	  
	  
Corbin,	  Mala	  (2014)	  ‘Abortion	  Distortions’	  William	  and	  Lee	  Law	  Review	  forthcoming,	  pre-­‐
publication	  copy	  available	  at:	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2375783	  
	  
Daly,	  Eoin	  (2013)	  ‘Religious	  freedom	  arguments	  in	  the	  abortion	  debate’	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Ireland	  





Daly,	  Eoin	  (2012),	  Religion,	  Law	  and	  the	  Irish	  State	  (Dublin:	  Clarus	  Press).	  
	  
De	  Londras,	  F.	  (forthcoming	  2015)	  'Constitutionalising	  Fetal	  Rights:	  A	  Salutary	  Tale	  from	  Ireland'	  
Michigan	  Journal	  of	  Gender	  and	  Law	  22(2)	  
	   27	  
	  
Department	  of	  Health	  (2014)	  Implementation	  of	  the	  Protection	  of	  Life	  During	  Pregnancy	  Act	  
2013:	  Guidance	  Document	  for	  Health	  Professionals	  
	  
Dickens,	  Bernard	  (2014)	  ‘The	  Right	  to	  Conscience’	  in	  Rebecca	  Cook,	  Joanna	  Erdman	  and	  Bernard	  
Dickens	  (eds.)	  Abortion	  Law	  in	  Transnational	  Perspective	  Philadelphia:	  University	  of	  
Pennsylvania	  Press,	  pp	  210-­‐238.	  	  	  
	  
Dickens,	  Bernard	  and	  Cook,	  Rebecca	  (2011)	  ‘Conscientious	  Commitment	  to	  Women’s	  Health’	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Gynecology	  and	  Obstetrics	  113(2):	  163-­‐166;	  available	  at:	  
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1832549	  
	  
Dickens,	  Bernard	  (2006)	  ‘Conscientious	  Objection:	  A	  Shield	  or	  a	  Sword?’	  in	  S.A.M.	  McLean,	  ed.	  
First	  Do	  No	  Harm:	  Law,	  Ethics	  and	  Healthcare	  (Aldershot,	  UK:	  Ashgate)	  337-­‐351	  
	  
Doctors	  for	  Choice	  (2014)	  Submission	  to	  the	  UNHRC	  for	  Ireland’s	  Review	  under	  the	  ICCPR;	  
available	  http://www.ccprcentre.org/doc/2014/06/INT_CCPR_CSS_IRL_17440_E.pdf	  
	  
Egan,	  Suzanne,	  Thornton,	  Liam	  and	  Walsh	  Judy	  (2014)	  Ireland	  and	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  
Human	  Rights:	  60	  years	  and	  beyond	  (Bloomsbury:	  Dublin)	  
	  
Erdman,	  Joanna	  (2011)	  ‘Access	  to	  Information	  on	  Safe	  Abortion:	  A	  Harm	  Reduction	  and	  Human	  
Rights	  Approach’	  Harvard	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Gender	  34:	  413-­‐462;	  available	  at	  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884387	  
	   28	  
	  
European	  Parliamentary	  Assembly	  (2010),	  Resolution	  1763	  
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/XRef/X2H-­‐DW-­‐XSL.asp?fileid=17909&lang=EN	  	  
	  
European	  Committee	  of	  Social	  Rights	  (2014),	  Decision	  on	  the	  Merits	  No.	  87/2012	  in	  the	  
complaint	  International	  Planned	  Parenthood	  Federation	  European	  Network	  (IPPF	  EN)	  v.	  Italy	  
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/NewsCOEPortal/CC87Merits_en.asp	  
	  
Fiala,	  Christian	  and	  Joyce	  Arthur	  (2014)	  “Dishonourable	  disobedience”	  -­‐	  why	  refusal	  to	  treat	  in	  
reproductive	  healthcare	  is	  not	  conscientious	  objection,	  Woman	  -­‐	  Psychosomatic	  Gynaecology	  
and	  Obstetrics	  1:	  12-­‐23;	  available	  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.woman.2014.03.001	  	  
	  
Fletcher,	  Ruth	  (2014)	  ‘Conscientious	  Objection	  and	  Harm	  Reduction	  in	  Europe’	  in	  T-­‐388/2009	  
Conscientious	  Objection	  and	  Abortion:	  A	  Global	  Perspective	  on	  the	  Colombian	  Experience,	  O’Neill	  




Fletcher,	  Ruth	  (2013a)	  ‘Peripheral	  Governance:	  Administering	  Transnational	  Healthcare	  Flows’	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Law	  in	  Context	  9:	  161-­‐190	  ;	  available	  at	  	  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2395895	  
	  
Fletcher,	  Ruth	  (2013b)	  Submission	  to	  the	  Health	  Committee	  on	  the	  General	  Scheme	  of	  the	  
Protection	  of	  Life	  During	  Pregnancy	  Bill,	  2013, in	  Houses	  of	  the	  Oireachtas	  Joint	  Committee	  on	  
	   29	  
Health	  and	  Children,	  Report	  on	  Protection	  of	  Life	  During	  Pregnancy	  Bill	  2013	  (Heads	  of)	  (Volume	  




Fletcher,	  Ruth	  (2008)	  “Reproductive	  Justice	  and	  Article	  40	  3	  3”,	  in	  Jennifer	  Schweppe	  ed.	  The	  
Unborn	  Child,	  Article	  40	  3	  3	  and	  Abortion	  in	  Ireland:	  25	  years	  of	  Protection?	  (Dublin:	  Liffey	  Press)	  
319-­‐348	  
	  
Fletcher,	  Ruth	  (1998)	  “‘Pro-­‐Life’	  Absolutes,	  Feminist	  Challenges:	  The	  Fundamentalist	  Narrative	  
of	  Irish	  Abortion	  Law	  1986-­‐92”,	  Osgoode	  Hall	  Law	  Journal	  36:	  1-­‐62	  
	  
Gallagher,	  C.T.	  A.	  Holton,	  L.	  J.	  McDonald,	  P.	  J.	  Gallagher	  (2013)	  ‘The	  fox	  and	  the	  grapes:	  an	  
Anglo-­‐Irish	  perspective	  on	  conscientious	  objection	  to	  the	  supply	  of	  emergency	  hormonal	  





General	  Medical	  Council	  (2013a)	  Good	  Medical	  Practice	  http://www.gmc-­‐
uk.org/guidance/good_medical_practice.asp	  
	  
General	  Medical	  Council	  (2013b),	  Personal	  Beliefs	  and	  medical	  practice,	  http://www.gmc-­‐
uk.org/static/documents/content/Personal_beliefs_and_medical_practice.pdf_51462245.pdf	  
	   30	  
	  








Joffe,	  Carole	  (1996),	  Doctors	  of	  Conscience	  (Boston,	  Beacon	  Press)	  
	  
Kantymir,	  Lori	  and	  Carolyn	  McLeod	  (2014),	  “Justification	  for	  Conscience	  Exemptions	  in	  Health	  
Care”	  Bioethics	  28(1):	  16-­‐23	  
	  
Kearns,	  D.	  (2015)	  'Clare	  Daly	  calls	  for	  Attorney	  General	  Advice	  to	  be	  published	  after	  fatal	  foetal	  




Kelleher,	  J	  Paul	  (2010),	  ‘Emergency	  Contraception	  and	  Conscientious	  Objection’	  Journal	  of	  
Applied	  Philosophy	  27(3):	  290-­‐304	  
	  
Lamackova,	  Adriana	  (2008)	  "Conscientious	  Objection	  in	  Reproductive	  Health	  Care:	  Analysis	  of	  
Pichon	  and	  Sajous	  v.	  France."	  European	  Journal	  of	  Health	  Law,	  15(1):	  7-­‐43	  
	   31	  
	  
McGuinness,	  S.	  and	  Thomson,	  M.	  (2015)	  'Medicine	  and	  Abortion	  Law:	  Complicating	  the	  
Reforming	  Profession'	  Medical	  Law	  Review	  23(2):	  177-­‐199.	  
	  
Medical	  Council	  (2009)	  Guide	  to	  Professional	  Conduct	  and	  Ethics	  (7th	  edition)	  
	  
Melling,	  Louise	  and	  Jennifer	  Lee	  (2014),	  ‘Lessons	  from	  Colombia	  to	  the	  United	  States’	  	  in	  T-­‐
388/2009	  Conscientious	  Objection	  and	  Abortion:	  A	  Global	  Perspective	  on	  the	  Colombian	  
Experience	  (Washington	  and	  Bogota:	  O’Neill	  Institute	  for	  National	  and	  Global	  Health	  and	  
Women’s	  Link	  Worldwide)	  111-­‐122	  
	  
Montgomery,	  J	  (2015)	  'Conscientious	  Objection:	  Personal	  and	  Professional	  Ethics	  in	  the	  Public	  
Square'	  Medical	  Law	  Review	  23(2):	  200-­‐220	  
	  
Murphy	  Mark	  (2014)	  Abortion	  law	  strangled	  at	  birth	  by	  medical	  guidelines.	  The	  Irish	  
Independent.	  9	  August.	  	  
	  
Murray	  Claire	  (2013)	  The	  narrative	  of	  the	  hysterical	  woman:	  the	  discourse	  on	  the	  inclusion	  of	  
suicide	  in	  the	  Irish	  legislation	  on	  abortion.	  Reforming	  Abortion	  Law:	  Comparative	  Perspectives	  
Conference,	  University	  College	  Cork,	  22	  March	  http://rightsni.org/2013/01/legislating-­‐for-­‐
article-­‐40-­‐3-­‐3-­‐murray-­‐on-­‐hysterical-­‐women/	  
	  
	   32	  
Neal,	  Mary	  (2014),	  'Commentary:	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  conscience-­‐based	  exemption	  in	  section	  4(1)	  
of	  the	  Abortion	  Act	  1967:	  Doogan	  and	  Wood	  v	  NHS	  Greater	  Glasgow	  and	  Clyde	  Health	  Board	  
[2013]	  CSIH	  36’	  Medical	  Law	  Review	  22(3):	  409-­‐421	  
	  
O’Brien,	  Breda	  (2013)	  “Mater	  Hospital	  nuns	  must	  stand	  up	  to	  bullying”	  The	  Irish	  Times,	  5	  
October	  
	  
O’Carroll,	  Sinead	  (2013a)	  ‘Emotional	  plea	  for	  change:	  Wrap	  your	  arms	  around	  us,	  don’t	  kick	  us	  
out’	  	  The	  Journal,	  13	  November	  	  
	  
O’Carroll,	  Sinead	  (2013b)	  ‘Mater	  hospital	  says	  it	  will	  comply	  with	  new	  abortion	  laws’	  The	  
Journal.	  15	  September.	  	  
	  
Raz,	  Joseph	  (2013)	  ‘Death	  in	  our	  Life’,	  Journal	  of	  Applied	  Philosophy	  30(1):	  1-­‐11	  	  
	  
Raz,	  Joseph	  (2009)	  The	  Authority	  of	  Law	  (Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press)	  
	  




Savulescu,	  Julian	  (2006)	  ‘Conscientious	  objection	  in	  medicine’	  British	  Medical	  Journal	  332:	  294–
297	  	  
	  
	   33	  
Schweppe,	  Jennifer	  and	  Spain,	  Emer	  (2013)	  ‘When	  is	  a	  Foetus	  not	  an	  Unborn?	  Fatal	  Foetal	  
Abnormalities	  and	  Article	  40	  3	  3’	  Irish	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  Studies	  3(3):	  92-­‐110	  http://ijls.ie/?p=381	  
	  
Sepper,	  Elizabeth	  (2014)	  “Doctoring	  Discrimination	  in	  the	  Same	  Sex	  Marriage	  Debates”	  Indiana	  
Law	  Journal	  89:	  703	  
	  
Sepper,	  Elizabeth	  (2013)	  “Contraception	  and	  the	  Birth	  of	  Corporate	  Conscience”,	  Washington	  
University	  in	  St.	  Louis	  Legal	  Studies	  Research	  Paper;	  available	  at:	  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2289383	  
	  
Sepper,	  Elizabeth	  (2012),	  “Taking	  Conscience	  Seriously”,	  Virginia	  Law	  Review	  98:	  101;	  available	  
at:	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1888375	  
	  
Taylor,	  M.	  (2015)	  'Women's	  Right	  to	  Health	  and	  Ireland's	  Abortion	  Laws'	  International	  Journal	  of	  
Gynaecology	  and	  Obstetrics	  130:	  93	  
T-­‐388/2009	  Conscientious	  Objection	  and	  Abortion:	  A	  Global	  Perspective	  on	  the	  Colombian	  
Experience,	  Washington	  and	  Bogota:	  O’Neill	  Institute	  for	  National	  and	  Global	  Health	  Law	  and	  
Women’s	  Link	  Worldwide,	  2014	  available	  at:	  
http://www.womenslinkworldwide.org/wlw/new.php?modo=detalle_proyectos&tp=publicacio
nes&dc=74	  (no	  authors	  identified	  as	  such)	  
	  	  
Thomson,	  Michael	  (2013)	  “Abortion	  Law	  and	  Professional	  Boundaries”	  Social	  and	  Legal	  Studies	  
22(2):	  191-­‐210	  
	  
	   34	  
Westeson,	  Johanna	  (2013)	  “Reproductive	  health	  information	  and	  abortion	  services:	  Standards	  
developed	  by	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Gynecology	  and	  
Obstetrics	  122:	  173–176	  
	  
Whyte,	  Gerry	  (2013)	  Five	  issues	  could	  prompt	  referral	  of	  abortion	  legislation	  to	  Supreme	  Court	  
The	  Irish	  Times.	  http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/five-­‐issues-­‐could-­‐prompt-­‐referral-­‐of-­‐
abortion-­‐legislation-­‐to-­‐supreme-­‐court-­‐1.1466620	  
	  
Wicclair	  M	  (2011)	  Conscientious	  Objection	  in	  Healthcare:	  An	  Ethical	  Analysis.	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press	  
	  
Women’s	  Link	  Worldwide	  (2012)	  Maternal	  Mortality,	  Unsafe	  Abortion	  and	  the	  Harm	  Reduction	  
Model:	  The	  Legal	  Platform;	  available	  at	  
http://www.womenslinkworldwide.org/wlw/new.php?modo=detalle_proyectos&dc=66	  
